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I study a model of replacement problem with liquidity constraint, where the land is used as a
collateral as well as a factor of production. The collateral value of the land restricts the available
funds for the ﬁrm, which works as a capacity constraint of ﬁrms. Due to this constraint, the
replacement can be enhanced when the positive technology and/or demand shocks arrives. This
stands in contrast with some types of replacement models, where the positive demand shocks
delay the replacement. The rise of the land price enlarges the available funds for the ﬁrms which
requires the eﬃcient use of the land, when the ﬁrms are under liquidity constraint. It also raises
the user’s cost of land, hence, the replacement of machine is enhanced. The eﬀects of the land
price on the the multi-factor productivity and replacement are examined by the data of Japan
during 1970 and 1998. The estimated results show that the rise of the land price enhance the
replacement and improves the multi-factor productivity in the non-service sectors, but I do not
observe the direct relationship between the replacement and the land price in the service sectors.
These results are consistent with the view that the land price aﬀects the replacement decisions
and productivity in non-service sectors. In service sectors, however, the other factors such as
the quality of investments could be important.
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The replacement decision of the machine is an important factor to determine the quality of capital
and productivity of ﬁrms. In the economy where the technology is embodied in capital, the frequent
replacement of capital implies the increase of productivity. In this paper, I propose a model of
replacement and show how the land price aﬀects the replacement decision of the ﬁrms with and
without liquidity constraint. I investigate the predictions of the model by using the Japanese data
after 1970, when the land price has signiﬁcantly ﬂuctuated.
In Japan, the land price rose rapidly in the late 80s and has dropped after the 90s. As Table 1
shows, the change is signiﬁcant. In the same periods, the multi-factor productivity has changed its
direction in 1990. But the direction of changes depend on industries. Table 2 shows the multi-factor
productivity of Japan.1 As this table shows, the multi-factor productivity of non-service sectors
has declined after 1990s, but the direction is opposite for the service industries. Many factors aﬀect
the multi-factor productivity, because the calculated multi-factor productivity, basically based on
the Solow’s residual, is aﬀected by returns to scale and labor hoarding. But in this paper, I focus on
the replacement decisions of the ﬁrms, and investigate how they aﬀect the quality of capital and the
productivity, when the land price ﬂuctuate. For this purpose, I ﬁrst develop a model of replacement
decisions of the ﬁrms with and without liquidity constraint. In the model, the land is used as a
factor of production but also works as a collateral to mitigate the liquidity constraint. Since the
liquidity constraint restrict the available funds of ﬁrms, the ﬁrms consider the most eﬃcient use of
available funds.
Such restrictions work as capacity constraints for the ﬁrms, and have important implications
on the replacement decisions of ﬁrms. In order to understand it, think about the rise of demand in
one industry. In response to the rise of demand, the ﬁrms would like to expand their capacity but
the ﬁnancial constraints prevent it. In some cases, the ﬁrms tend to destroy less eﬃcient machine
and purchase new machine in order to save the available funds.
This implication is related to the literature of the machine replacement models. In the vintage
capital model of Solow (1956), the labor input works as a ﬁxed costs, and the introduction of
new technology raise the labor demand and the wages, which make the use of old, less eﬃcient
capital unproﬁtable (Boucekkine, Germain, and Licandro (1997) for more recent theoretical work).
The similar mechanisms work in diﬀerent models such as machine replacement problems in Rust
(1987), Jovanovic and Rob (1997), and Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999). In their models,
1Construction of data is explained later.
1the embodied technological advance enhances the replacement, because the embodied technological
advance makes the existing machine relatively more obsolescent and less attractive.2 There, invest-
ments are directly related to the replacement, because there is a capacity constraint of capital, in
the sense that one ﬁrm owns only one machine to operate. That capacity constraint is critical for
the replacement decisions, because the ﬁrm would operate two machines (old and new machines)
without such constraints. The assumption of such capacity constraints can be supported by several
reasons such as the limited ability of the manager to operate multiple machines. My model add
one possible constraint in the sense that the capital capacity is constrained by the available funds.
One advantage of my model is that I can make the capacity constraint endogenous, and analyze
how the land price explicitly aﬀect the replacement by changing the capacity itself.
The optimal replacement decisions are also studied in the creative destruction models (Ca-
ballero and Engel (1999) and Aghion and Howitt (1994)). In those models, there are no capacity
constraints, and the replacement is mainly determined by its proﬁtability that is the productivity
minus the ﬁxed costs. For example, when the labor costs are ﬁxed costs, the models predicts more
replacement when ﬁxed costs (wage rates) increase or the productivity declines, because the old
machine is less proﬁtable. Especially, the positive demand shock delays the replacement. This re-
lationship is apparently correct for job destruction model (Caballero and Hammour (1994)), where
more job destruction (i.e., more replacement) is observed in recession. For the case of machine
replacement, Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993) observed that the machine replacement is more likely
to occur during downturns where the resource cost of replacement is lower. Campbell (1998) also
ﬁnds the negative relation between the replacement and the output by using the exit rates as a
proxy for the replacement. Clearly, this prediction is diﬀerent from the vintage capital model above,
where the investment is equal to the replacement, thus, the replacement is more frequent in the
economic boom.
In this paper, I propose a model to mitigate these opposing views by introducing the liquidity
constraint. Due to the liquidity constraint, the available funds restrict the capital that the managers
can purchase. In this respect, the model is closer to the replacement model, since, there, the number
of capital is restricted. As a result, the positive demand shocks enhance the replacement. On the
other hand, I can show that the ﬁrms may delay the replacement in the economic booms, when the
liquidity constraint is not so restrictive. That is more in line with the creative destruction model.
My model is closely related to the literature of investment under liquidity constraint (Kiyotaki
2In Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), the ﬁrms destruct less eﬃcient, old machine by using the old
machine more intensively when the positive embodied technical shocks arrive.
2and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)), although
they do not take the replacement decisions into account. As I show it later, the decisions of
investments and replacements are diﬀerent, although they are related.
The model predicts the eﬀects of the land price on the replacement decisions and multi-factor
productivity. There are two eﬀects for the ﬁrms with liquidity constraint when the land price
rises. The ﬁrst eﬀect is caused by the rise of capital costs. This raises the ﬁxed costs of holding
capital and increases the replacement, which improve the productivity of remaining capital (thus,
raises the multi-factor productivity). The second eﬀect is caused by the weakening of the liquidity
constraint. When the land price rises, the ﬁrms can purchase more new capital, thus, increases
the replacement. As a result, I show that the rise of the land price enhances the replacement and
improve the productivity for the ﬁrms under the liquidity constraint.
On the other hand, when the ﬁrm face no liquidity constraint, only the ﬁrst eﬀect works without
the second eﬀect. Thus, the replacement is also enhanced, but the degree is smaller. In addition,
when the land price rises very rapidly, then holding the land itself produces the net capital gains,
and the land is considered as an asset rather than a cost of production. In such cases, the situation
is reversed, and the rise of land price reduces the total cost of capital (including the land and
machine) and allow the ﬁrms to use less eﬃcient capital. This is possible explanation why the land
price reduces the multi-factor productivity when the land price rises rapidly. And this eﬀect is
stronger for the ﬁrms without liquidity constraint.
In order to understand the validity of the model, I use the Japanese data for estimation. It is
important to use the Japanese data since the land prices have ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly over the past
few decades. I focus on the two types of Japanese data in estimation: the multi-factor productivity
and the replaced value of capital. In the ﬁrst estimation, I use the multi-factor productivity whose
trends are summarized in Table 2. The data is taken from Fukao, Inui, Kawai, and Miyagawa
(2003), who calculate the multi-factor productivity from the Japan Industrial Database (the JIP
Database). They take into accounts the eﬀect of intermediate goods, capital utilization rates, and
quality of labor. Since they do not consider the eﬀect of production of scale, this number is aﬀected
by the business cycles.3
In the second estimation, I use the replaced capital as an dependent variable. The data of
the replaced capital is estimated from the Quarterly Review of Non-ﬁnancial enterprizes in Japan.
This data allow us directly to examine the eﬀect of the land prices on the replacement, although
3Especially, when there is an increasing return to scale, the calculated multi-factor productivity has an upward
bias (downward bias, respectively) in case of economic booms (recessions).
3the data may include noises, because it is the book value of replaced capital. By using the single
equation GMM, I have the results that the rise of land prices enhance the replacement and raises
the productivity in the non-service sectors. But the eﬀects of the land price on the replacement is
not clear for service sectors. Thus, the overall result is consistent with the model in the non-service
sector, although it is not clear in the service sectors. The multi-factor productivity in the service
sectors may be more aﬀected by the reasons other than the replacements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a basic model. In section 3,
I present the data of Japan and conduct the estimation. In section 4, alternative explanation is
considered and the related result in the US is also discussed.
2 Model
I follow the strand of the literature in which the ﬁrms invest under the liquidity constraint (Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)). I consider the discrete time model,
and all aggregate variables such as the aggregate shock of At, the product price (Pt), the price
of land Qt, and the capital price (PI
t ) are realized at the beginning of the period. There is a
measure of ﬁrms (thus inﬁnitely many) who are risk-neutral and have ability to produce the goods
competitively. Then, the ﬁrms, who have the existing capital stock of Kt−1 and the land of Tt−1,
choose the amount of investments (It) and land (Tt). They also borrow the necessary funds (Bt)
from the banks. After this transaction is completed, the idiosyncratic shock of 
j
t is realized for
each machine, and the ﬁrms make the optimal destruction decisions of machine. The production
is conducted at the end of period, and the repayment of borrowing and the second hand markets
for capital and land opens at the beginning of the next period. Thus, due to this assumption, the
capital gain or loss may happen by holding the asset and capital, although there is no uncertainty
during the production process.
The eﬃciency of each machine is denoted by 
j
t, which follows an iid process (across machines
and time) whose mean is one and cdf is deﬁned by F(). In this economy, each ﬁrm uses the
continuum of capital; therefore, each ﬁrm faces no uncertainty concerning 
j
t. I will show that the
optimal policy is to set the cut-oﬀ level of t, below which the machine is destroyed.4 Denote the
capital level before and after the machine destruction by Kb and K, respectively. They have the
4I assume that there are no second hand markets during the period. Thus, the ﬁrms need to destroy the machine
in order to prevent the ﬁxed costs.
4following relationship:
Kb
t = It + Kt−1, Kt = ¯ F(t)Kb
t. (1)
In the above expression, It is the amount of investment, and ¯ F is the fraction of  above the critical
value (), i.e., ¯ F() = 1 − F().
The aggregate production function depends on the total number of capital measured in terms











0 dF(0) = Φ(t)Kt. (2)
where the integral in the ﬁrst equation is taken over the existing capital stock in the ﬁrm, and Φ
is an average quality of capital after destruction, and deﬁned by Φ(t) =
R
 dF/ ¯ F.
The total ﬂow proﬁt from operating the continuum of capital after machine destruction is
derived as follows:
Pt AtKe
t − cfKt = Pt AtΦ(t)Kt − cfKt. (3)
Here, At is the aggregate productivity in the economy.5 Pt is a product price, and cf is a ﬁxed cost
in holding one unit of capital. I assume that the constant returns to scale technology.6
Following the literature of investment models under liquidity constraint, I assume the risk
neutral ﬁrms with the discount factor of β, who delay their own consumption in the future. They
lose the ability of producing the goods with probability z. After that event, they are pure consumers.
In order to assure these situations in the steady state, I assume the following:
Assumption 1 Pt At − cf − τ(RtQt − Qt+1) + PI
t+1 > Rt PI
t , βRt < 1.
The ﬁrst assumption is to ensure that the investment project is proﬁtable so that all of the available
resources are used for investments as long as the managers have ability to produce the goods. By
the second condition, the ﬁrms consume immediately after they lose the production ability. The
amount of investments are restricted by the following ﬂow of funds equation:
PI
t (It + Kt−1) + QtTt ≤ Wt + Bt, (4)
where Bt stands for the amount of the loan, and Qt is the land price. Wt is a net wealth of the
ﬁrm after repaying the debt:
Wt = Pt−1 At−1 Φ(t−1)Kt−1 − cfKt−1 + QtTt−1 + PI
t Kt−1 − Rt−1Bt−1, (5)
5When the labor input is included in production, this term is considered as the reduced form after optimally
adjusting the labor input. I ignore the ﬂuctuation of wage rates.
6I study the eﬀects of the increasing returns to scale in the Appendix.
5where Rt is one plus the interest rate of risk-free assets.
Next, consider how the land is used in the production process. Here, in order to simplify the
analysis, I assume the Leontief production function, in which each machine requires τ amount of
land for production.7 Speciﬁcally,
Tt = τKt, (6)
where τ is a constant. Now I consider the two types of ﬁrms: the ﬁrst type of ﬁrms is constrained
by liquidity, and the other type is not.
Firms without liquidity constraints
When the ﬁrms are not constrained by liquidity, they invest as much as possible to the limit of
available investment project, ¯ Kt, because the rate of returns is higher than the return on the other
assets (Rt).
Kb
t ≤ ¯ Kt. (7)
Here, note that the limited number of projects is the amount of capital before destruction. Thus,
the ﬁrms are constrained by the number of proﬁtable projects rather than the loanable funds. By
denoting the value function of ﬁrms by V , we can deﬁne the maximization problem for the ﬁrms
as follows:













Kt ≤ Wt + Bt,
Wt+1 =





Kt ≤ ¯ Kt ¯ F(t), (8)
where St is a vector of aggregate variables, St = (Pt,PI
t ,Qt). The ﬁrst constraint is the ﬂow of
funds equation (4), where I use the deﬁnition of investments, (1). The second constraint is the
deﬁnition of net wealth, (5). The last constraint is from (7). The Bellman’s equation reﬂect the
assumption that the ﬁrms lose their abilities to produce the goods with probability z, in which
case they consume all of their net wealth. Otherwise, they continue to operate, then their value is
V (St+1,Wt+1).
7In the Appendix, I consider the case in which the ﬁxed amount of land (Tt) is used for production. This is another
extreme case. In this alternative assumption, the land price is not directly included in the ﬁrst order condition. Thus,
without scale of returns, the land price does not aﬀect the replacement decisions.
6It is clear that the value function is an increasing function of W without uncertainty. In that




Pt At Φ(t) − cf + τQt+1 + PI
t+1 − τRtQt

¯ F(t) ¯ Kt − RtPI
t ¯ Kt + RtWt.
I assume the interior value of t by the following assumption.
Assumption 2 cf + τ(RtQt − Qt+1) − PI
t > 0.
Then, the ﬁrst order condition is,
Pt At t − cf − τ(RtQt − Qt+1) + PI
t+1 = 0. (9)
The ﬁrst term is the marginal revenue in operating the marginal quality of machine. The other
terms are the ﬁxed costs of holding machine. The last term is the return when they sell the machine
in the next period. The cost of machine, PI
t , is not included in deciding the optimal destruction,
since the cost is already sunk. The intuition is standard and same as Caballero and Hammour
(1994): The ﬁrms delay the destruction of machine when the demand (the product price) increases
or the ﬁxed costs decline.
The eﬀects of the land price depend on cases. When RtQt > Qt+1, it is costly to hold the
land. In that case, the rise of land price raises the ﬁxed cost of holding the machine, because some
amount of land is required for production. But, when the land price is expected to rise signiﬁcantly
(RtQt < Qt+1), the land is considered as an asset to produce the net proﬁt. Then, the rise of land
price increase the rate of return on holding the machine. Then, the less eﬃcient machine (i.e.,
machine with low ) can survive, since its low return is compensated by the higher return on the
land.8
Proposition 1 Without uncertainty and liquidity constraint, the unexpected rise of Pt and/or At
lower . The proportionate increase of Qt and QI
t+1 raises  when RtQt > Qt+1, but lowers  when
RtQt < Qt+1.
Firms under liquidity constraints
8When the returns on the land is greater than Rt, the demand for the safe asset is zero without uncertainty. In
order to justify the situation, I need to assume that only managers can hold the land.
7Next, consider the optimal decision of ﬁrms under liquidity constraint. I assume that the
lending relationship ends in one period and lenders have no ways to enforce the loan contracts to
ﬁrms except for the use of the land as collateral. Thus, the minimum amount that the banks can
ensure is the expected market value of collateralized land. Whenever the banks lend more than
that amount, the managers use the entire resource for their private use. Suppose that the fraction,
γ, of land holding can be used as a collateral. Then, the limit of loanable funds is,
RtBt ≤ γEtQt+1Tt. (10)
The maximization problem in this case is similar to (8), but now the amount of loan (B) is restricted
by (10). By assuming that the ﬁrms borrow all available funds, we have the maximization problem
of the ﬁrms under the liquidity constraint:
























t+1 is an expected value of Qt+1. Again, without any uncertainty, the value function is an


















Under the current assumption, the ﬁrms invest as much as possible, and the constraint is binding.
Then, by eliminating the capital (Kt) in the expression, the maximization is to maximize the rate
of return on the wealth.
max
t








Under the assumption 2, the solution is interior. The ﬁrst order condition is,












In order to understand the proposition, I modify the equation (13):




























8The second equation comes from the ﬁrst order condition of (13) and the deﬁnition of wealth, (12).
Thus, the second bracket on the right-hand side is the excess return on the investments over the
market interest rate (i.e., Wt+1/Wt − Rt), which is always positive under the current assumption.
Without liquidity constraint, the right-hand side is always zero, which is clear from the optimal
condition of the ﬁrms without the liquidity constraint, (9). The ﬁrms without liquidity constraint
simply makes the marginal product equal to the marginal costs. The ﬁrms under the liquidity
constraint, however, have additional constraint. Due to the liquidity constraint, the ﬁrms compare
two alternative choices: keep to use the machine of marginal quality or replace it with the new
machine. By keeping the marginal machine, the ﬁrms get the beneﬁts expressed in the left-hand
side. On the other hand, when they replace it with the new one, then τ units of land are available
for replacement, but they do not have liquidity to purchase the new machine. In order to buy
the new machine, they need to sell some amount of land, but it reduces the borrowing limit of
ﬁrms (say, by ∆Bt). By selling τ units of land, the total amount of money free for purchasing the
machine and land is τ(Qt − ∆Bt) = τ(Qt − (γ/Rt)Qt+1). For each unit of money, the return is
Wt+1/Wt. As the right-hand side of the ﬁrst equation shows, this beneﬁt is calculated based on
the expected returns on the new machine, since the quality of new machine is uncertain.
From this equation, several properties are clear. First, the critical value of t is always higher
for the ﬁrms with liquidity constraint than those without it, by comparing this expression with (9).
This is because the ﬁnancial constraint restricts the use of available funds, inducing more eﬃcient
use of land. Second, under the liquidity constraint, the rise of land prices raises the replacement
when the growth rate of the land price is low. In addition, it can be shown that the eﬀect on
the marginal quality of machine, t, is stronger for the ﬁrms with the liquidity constraint than for
those without it. Equation (14) shows this point intuitively. As the left-hand side of the equation
shows, the land price raises the quality of marginal machine directly since the rental price of land
rises. This eﬀect is same for both the ﬁrms with and without liquidity constraint. But the ﬁrms
under the liquidity constraint have an additional shock that is shown on the right-hand side of (14).
As the ﬁnancial constraint is relaxed, the ﬁrms can spend more on purchasing the new machine
which is potentially more productive. That enhances more replacement. Although the eﬀect on
the right-hand side is more complicated, I can show that this intuition is basically true when the
land price does not decline so heavily.
Third, the positive demand shocks (the rise of Pt) and technology shocks (the rise of At)
increase the replacement of machine in some cases. As shown in the equation (14), the rise of Pt
and At raises the returns of both the marginal machine (LHS) and the replaced machine (RHS).
9When this industry is land intensive (high τ) and/or this ﬁrms are more heavily constrained by
liquidity (low γ), the available funds by destroying one machine is larger. As a result, the total
return of replacement is higher than that of keeping the marginal machine. As a result, the ﬁrms
are more selective in choosing the quality of machine. This property is similar to the standard
machine replacement problem where the ﬁrm can operate only one machine. In those models, the
replacement happens because the number of machine is exogenously given. In my model, however,
the number of available machine is determined by the available funds which are endogenously
determined. Without liquidity constraint, the model would become a standard creative destruction
model, where the destruction of machine is solely determined by the productivity and the ﬁxed
costs.
I can summarize the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Without aggregate uncertainty but under the liquidity constraint, the (unexpected)
proportionate increase of PI
t and PI
t+1 reduces t. The (unexpected) rise of Pt and/or At raise t,
when τ(1 − γ)Qt+1 + PI
t+1 > cf, but they reduce t, otherwise. The proportionate increase of Qt
and Qt+1 raises t, when Qt+1/Qt < g∗
1 for some g∗
1 > Rt. Otherwise, it reduces t. The change of




Proof. See the Appendix.
3 Data and Estimation
I conduct two types of estimation. In the ﬁrst estimation, I investigate the eﬀect of land prices on
the multi-factor productivity. Next, I directly estimate the eﬀect on the replaced value of plant
and equipment investments.
For the ﬁrst estimation, the data of multi-factor productivity is taken from Fukao, Inui, Kawai,
and Miyagawa (2003). They are yearly data, whose sample periods is from 1970 to 1998. In calcu-
lating the multi-factor productivity, the authors adjusted the labor quality, the capacity utilization
rates in calculation, but not the returns to scale. I eliminate this bias by including the output
as an explanatory variables in estimation. Speciﬁcally, I directly estimate the production function
with the elasticity of scale of ν. The speciﬁc form of function is same as in the basic model which






10where ut is the capacity utilization of the ﬁrm. By taking the log and diﬀerence, and assuming
that lnAt follows the random walk with drift (lnAt = lnAt−1 + ηt + a0),9 we have,
d(yt − ut − kt) = a0 + ν d lnΨ(t) + (ν − 1)(dut + dkt) + ηt, (16)
where xt = lnXt. On the other hand, the multi-factor productivity calculated in JIP database is,
dMFPt = dyt − dut − dkt. (17)
By eliminating the dut + dk from the above expression, we have,
ν dMFPt = a0





+ (ν − 1)dyt + ηt. (18)
Here, the marginal quality of capital, , is replaced by the policy function, where the state variables
are (At,Qt/Pt,PI
t /Pt).10 Equation (9) implicitly deﬁnes this function when the ﬁrms are not under
liquidity constraint, while this function is (14) when the ﬁrms are constrained by the liquidity. By
taking the log and linealization, we have,
dMFPt = a0 + a2 d(qt − pt) + a3 d(pI
t − pt) + a4dyt + ηt. (19)
The eﬀects on the MFP are same as those on : The rise of pI decreases  and MFP. The rise of
Qt increases  and MFP for the ﬁrms, especially for the ﬁrms under the liquidity constraint. But it
can reduces the  and MFP in some cases. The eﬀects of Y is positive when there is an increasing
return to scale. Since the current explanatory variables are aﬀected by the current productivity
shock, I use the GMM without serial correlation. I use the lagged variables (both dependent and
explanatory variables) as the instruments of estimation. Since I take the ﬁrst diﬀerence and need
to have enough lags, the estimated sample period is 1977 to 1998 (22 years).
Table 3 shows the estimated results for service and non-service industries. The sign conditions
of variables are correct for the output and the capital price. For the land prices, the eﬀects are
opposite for service and non-service industries. The land price raises the eﬃciency of capital for
the non-service, while it reduces MFP for service sectors. One explanation in relation to the model
is that the ﬁrms are more liquidity constrained in the non-service industries, which justiﬁes the
positive eﬀect on productivity. On the other hand, the rise of the land prices is so high for the
9The aggregate technology growth may be correlated with the past explanatory variables such as the past factor
inputs (Hall (1988)). I, however, use my current formulation partly because I assume that  can explain these
movements of the Solow residuals, and partly because of the diﬃculty of obtaining eﬀective instruments.
10I omitted the interest rates for estimation.
11service industry that the ﬁrms consider the land as assets than the cost of capital. This reduces
the productivity of capital.
I also estimate the eﬀect of the land prices on the replaced value of capital directly. The re-
placed value of the plant and equipment is constructed based on the Financial Statements Statistics
of Corporations prepared by the Ministry of Finance of Japan. It reports the book value of dis-
carded and sold equipments quarterly.11 Since the reported data are book values after deducting
depreciation, these values are subject to the depreciation methods and price changes over time.
Thus, I constructed the values of replaced capital on the constant price basis. I use the benchmark
year method in calculating the present value of capital stock, investments, and replaced capital
(although the benchmark year method is not necessary in calculating the replaced capital, it is
important to construct the capital stock to see if the produced capital and the replaced capital
are consistent. Refer to the Appendix for the detail). This approach, using the replaced values of
capital, looks better than the estimation of multi-factor productivity, since we can study the eﬀect
of the land price directly, but there is a problem of measurement error as the replaced series are
originally book values.
Figure 1 shows the trends of these series. The level of replaced capital is fairly stable if I
compared them with the investments.12 But, the yearly ﬂuctuation is large and the magnitudes
are almost same as those of investments. It is also important to ﬁnd that the trends of the
growth rates of the replaced equipments are much diﬀerent from those of investments. Figure
2 reports the replacement ratio by industry and ﬁrm size. It is noteworthy that the small size
(non-manufacturing) ﬁrms increased the replacement during the late 80s, when the land price rose
rapidly.
In order to estimate the eﬀect of the land price, I estimate the relationship between t and Rt
derived from the model. In the model, Kb

















By taking the log and linealizing the expression, we have,
drt = b0 + b1 d(qt − pt) + b2 d(pI
t − pt) + b3 dit + b4 dyt + ηt, (21)
where rt is a replacement rate (rt = lnRt/Kt−1), and it is an investment rate (it = lnIt/Kt−1).
Here, I include the eﬀect of output to see the eﬀect of the demand and technology shocks. Since
11Although it is quarterly, I use the annualized data to avoid the possible serial correlation and to keep the
consistency with the JIP data. In addition, the quarterly land price is not available.
12It may be due to the book value nature of this series.
12the F is an increasing function, the critical value (t) and the replacement (rt) move in the same
direction: the rise of pI decreases  and rt. The rise of Qt increases  and MFP for the ﬁrms when
the land prices are not expected to rise so high. Otherwise, the eﬀect may be negative. The eﬀect
of investments, it, is positive. The eﬀects of output, yt, is negative, when the positive shocks to the
output delays the replacement as indicated by the creative destruction model. It is positive, when
the technological progress is embodied and the machine replacement model is more relevant. In
order to avoid the simultaneous bias, I use the single equation GMM without serial correlation. The
instruments are the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced lagged variables (both dependent and explanatory variables).
The results are shown in Table 4. The table shows that the eﬀect of capital price is negative
as expected in non-service sectors, but not clear in the service sectors. Investments raises the
replacements in the service industry which is consistent with the model, but not true in non-service
sectors. The eﬀects of output are negative for both sectors, which indicate the positive productivity
shocks delay the replacement, which is more in line with the creative destruction model, and it is
more consistent with the case of the ﬁrms without liquidity constraint.
The eﬀects of land price is positive for the non-service sectors. This result is consistent with
the ﬁrst estimation in Table 3: The rise of land prices enhance the replacement and raises the
productivity. But the eﬀect of the land price is not clear for service sectors. Thus, the eﬀect on
the replacement may not be so important to characterize the overall decline of productivity growth
during the estimated periods when the land prices rose sharply. But overall, the coeﬃcients are not
so robust for the speciﬁcation of instruments and the choice of explanatory variables. In addition,
the sample size is small. Thus, we need to interpret the estimation results with caution.
4 Discussion
Other interpretations
There is a vast literature for the costly external ﬁnance (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Myers and Majluf (1984)). In those models, the increase of asset prices leads to the increase
of free cash ﬂow and expands the investments. The managers may choose the ineﬃcient way
of investments when the cash ﬂow is abundant when the ﬁrms prefer the growth over the proﬁt
(Jensen (1986)).13. Clearly, this paper is not an alternative to those models but complements them
by introducing diﬀerent perspective, since my model focuses on the replacement problem rather
13The possibility of the over-investment may not be applied to Japan according to Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein
(1991).
13than the investment problem. As we have seen in the introduction, the movements of replacements
and investments are diﬀerent. In addition, my model shows that the rise of the land prices can
reduce the eﬃciency of capital even for the large ﬁrms where the agency problems are less important.
Reallocation eﬀects
In the United States, the signiﬁcant amount of total productivity of industry is aﬀected by the
reallocation eﬀect, in the sense that the high productivity ﬁrms expands, while the low productivity
ﬁrms lose their shares. This reallocation eﬀect also works when the asset price rises. When the
productivity of liquidity constrained ﬁrms are higher than others, then the expansion of those ﬁrms
improve the aggregate productivity of the economy (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), for example).
Jermann and Quadrini (2002) show that the reallocation eﬀect was important in the early 90s in
US, when the stock prices went up.
The situation, however, looks diﬀerent in Japan. By using the plant level data in Japan, Fukao
and Kwon (2003) shows that the eﬀect of reallocation is not so strong. Second, the share of the
small ﬁrms in investments did not expand in the late 80s when the stock and land prices rose
rapidly. As is clear from the direct observation, there are no major discrepancies of investment
behaviors by ﬁrm sizes, especially during the late 80s. This situations stand in contrast with those
in US, and justify to focus on the behaviors of individual ﬁrms as in the current paper.
14Appendix
Alternative assumtion on the use of land in production process.
In this Appendix, I consider the case in which the ﬁxed amount of land is used for production.
T1 = 1.
In addition, the technology exhibits the returns to scale whose elasticity of scale is denoted by ν.
Let’s consider the two cases, the ﬁrms without and with liquidity constraint, in turn.
Firms without liquidity constraints
When the ﬁrms are not liquidity constrained, they face the condition of available projects, (7).
Then, the maximization problem is similar to (8):











Kt + Qt ≤ Wt + Bt,
Wt+1 = pt At Φ(t)γK
γ
t − cfKt + Qt+1 + PI
t+1Kt − RtBt,
Kt ≤ ¯ Kt ¯ F(t), (A.1)
Without uncertainty, the optimal cutoﬀ point () is derived by maximizing Wt+1. By substituting
the constraints, Wt+1 is
Wt+1 = pt At (Φ(t))γ( ¯ F(t) ¯ Kt)γ − cf ¯ F(t) ¯ Kt + Qt+1 + PI
t+1 ¯ F(t) ¯ Kt − RtPI
t ¯ Kt − RtQt + RtWt.
The ﬁrst order condition is,
γpt At (Φ(t) ¯ F(t) ¯ Kt)γ−1 t − pt cf + PI
t+1 = 0. (A.2)
It is clear that the land price is not included in this ﬁrst order condition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that there is no uncertainty in the aggregate variables. Then, the unex-
pected rise of Pt and/or At lower . The land price does not aﬀect this decision.
Firms under liquidity constraints
As in (10), the limit of loanable funds is,
RtBt ≤ γEtQt+1Tt, (A.3)
15The maximization problem for the ﬁrms is similar to (11):
















Wt+1 = pt At Φ(t)γK
γ
t − cfKt + Qt+1 + PI
t+1Kt − γQ∗
t+1, (A.4)
















The ﬁrst order conditions are:
γ pt At Φ(t)γK
γ−1















Combining together and eliminating λt, we have the optimal condition for t
γ pt At Φ(t)γ−1K
γ−1
t t − cf + PI
t+1 = 0. (A.5)















= cf − PI
t+1. (A.6)
It is clear that the land price aﬀect the replacement decision except for the case of constant return
to scale (γ = 1). Also, note that the deﬁnition of the wealth produces the following relation:
Wt − Qt +
γ
Rt
Qt+1 = pt−1 At−1 Φ(t−1)γK
γ
t−1 − cfKt−1 + PI




Thus, the unexpected rise of the current and future land prices, Qt+j (j ≥ 0), increases the ﬁrst
bracket of the left-hand side of (A.6). When γ > 1, we can show that t is lowered (low destruction)
when the second bracket of the left-hand side is an increasing function of t. This condition is
satisﬁed when,
(C1) : Φ(t) ¯ F(t) > (γ − 1)2
tf(t), (A.8)
16where f is a density of F(). This condition is satisﬁed when γ is close to one,  is low, and f
is small. Intuitively, when the land price rises, the investments increase, and so does the output.
Then, when there is an increasing return to scale technology, the productivity of the ﬁrm improves.
As in the case of no liquidity constraint, the improvement of productivity reduces the replace-
ment decision. But, the eﬀect on the multi-factor productivity is uncertain, because the reduction
of machine replacement lower the multi-factor productivity, but the increased output raises the
productivity due to the increasing returns to scale.
Proposition 4 When there is no uncertainty and the condition (C1) holds, the unexpected rise of
Pt and/or At lowers . The increase of Qt+1 also reduces .
Proof of Proposition 2.




















First, I consider the eﬀect of the rise of PI. Suppose that both sides of the equation are positive. Then, the
right-hand side declines due to the rise of PI, but the left-hand side increases. In order to keep the equality,
t must fall, since the left-hand side is a decreasing function of t. We can do the same thing when both
sides are negative.
Next, consider the eﬀect of the increase of At (the eﬀect of Pt is exactly same). Suppose that both sides
of the equation are positive, that is, τ(1−γ)Qt+1+PI
t+1 > cf. Then, the increase of At raises the right-hand
side, so t must rise in order to restore the equality. When both sides are negative, then we can get the
opposite conclusion.
Now, I investigate the eﬀect of the proportionate rise of Qt and Qt+1. By taking the total diﬀerentiation























The denominator is always positive, but the numerator is positive if and only if,







When we deﬁne the critical value of g∗
1 that holds the above expression with equality, then t rises if and
only if gt < g∗
1. Note also that g∗
1 > Rt.
Lastly, I compare the eﬀect of the land price on t for the ﬁrms with and without liquidity constraints.
The eﬀect with the liquidity constraint is shown in (A.10). The eﬀect without the liquidity constraint is








By comparing the two expressions, I can show that the eﬀect is greater for the ﬁrms with the liquidity









It is always true when gt ≥ Rt. When gt < Rt, we can deﬁne the critical value of g∗
2 that satisﬁes the above
expression with equality. Then, the above inequality is true if and only if gt > g∗
2. Clearly, g∗
2 < Rt. Q.E.D.
Construction of replaced value of capital.
In constructing the replaced value of capital, I use the quarterly ﬁnancial statement published by the Ministry
of Finance. Although the industry total is only available for this database, it reports the quarterly data for
ﬁfty years (from the second quarter of 1954 to present). The reported data includes the value of capital
stock, investments, and replaced values of capital stocks by industry and ﬁrm size. Since all of them are book
values, I constructed these variables of the constant price basis. For the calculation, I use the benchmark
year method. First, the investment series are divided by the deﬂators of investment goods to produce the
real series (taken from SNA accounts). Then, the value of the initial capital stock (in the ﬁrst year of 1955)
is set six times higher than the book value. This choice is arbitrary, but the choice does not aﬀect the trend
ﬁfteen years later (after 1970), which I use for estimation.
By initially using the yearly depreciation rate of 5%, I construct the tentative capital stock series by
using the following formula:
Kt = It + (1 − 0.05)Kt−1. (A.14)
As a result, we can get the tentative series of replaced capital as e Ra
t = 0.05Kt−1. Now I use the actual
replaced value of capital, e Rb
t. Since this is the values when they were purchased, I inﬂated the data by using





Pt + Pt−1 + ... + Pt−3
. (A.15)
The lag for inﬂation (four years) comes from the fact that the cross correlation between the investments
and replacements are largest when the lag of correlation is two years. Since this replaced value is net of
depreciation, I multiply the series by some constant to recover the gross value of capital. The constant is
determined by taking the ratio of e Ra
t to e Rr
t (but not exactly same). If I compare the two series, e Ra
t and e Rr
t,
then the long-term trends are quite similar, which conﬁrms the validity of data construction.
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20Table 1. The trend of the land price of Japan 
 
   1980/1970  1990/1980 1998/1990
Total industries  6.38%  9.12% -6.36%
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport of Japan. 
Note: Growth rates of the commercial areas in the three major urban 






Table 2. Multi-factor productivity of Japan 
 
   1980/1970  1990/1980 1998/1990
Total industries  0.10%  0.25% 0.08%
   Non-service  0.66%  0.73% 0.05%
   Service  -0.52%  -0.37% 0.12%
Source: JIP Database (2003), Table 6-14. 
Note: The numbers are annual rates over the corresponding years. 
 


















































Source: Author’s calculation based on “Quarterly Financial Statement of Incorporation,” by Ministry of 
Finance of Japan. 
Note: Growth rate is the rate from the 4 quarters before. 








































































































































































Source: Author’s calculation based on “Quarterly Financial Statement of Incorporation,” by Ministry of 
Finance of Japan. 
Note: Growth rate is the rate from the 4 quarters before. 
          Big firms: Firms with capital of 1 billion yen or more in all industry. 
          Small firms: Firms with capital of less than 100 million yen in non-manufacturing industry. 




Industry     Service  Industry   
    Theta SE  t-value   Theta SE  t-value 
Capital price  -0.0728  0.0336 -2.1690  -0.4406 0.1428  -3.0857
Land price  0.0217  0.0073 2.9612   -0.0550 0.0148  -3.7151
Output 0.1746  0.0232 7.5291   0.1273 0.0913  1.3947
Constant 0.0010  0.0010 0.9594  -0.0131 0.0034  -3.8880
             
   J-stat  Critical J  p-value   J-stat  Critical  J  p-value 
Over-identification 15.95  27.59 0.6181  19.79 27.59  0.3601
Null = only 
constant 254.66  7.81 0.0000   41.35 7.81  0.0000
 
Notes: estimation period: 1977 to 1998. 
           Instruments: The first-differenced MFP, land prices, production, and capital prices. 
                              5 Lags are taken for each instrument (i.e., variables of 2 years to 6 years 
before). 
Note: Estimation period is 1977 to 1998. 
          Instruments: the first-differenced MFP, land price, production, and capital prices. 









Industry     Service  Industry   
   Theta  SE  t-value    Theta  SE  t-value 
Capital price  -0.1661  0.0091
-
18.1745  0.0021 0.0576  0.0372
Investment -0.1397  0.0475 -2.9438  0.2023 0.0597  3.3897
Land price  0.0372  0.0038 9.8968   0.0011 0.0118  0.0918
Output -0.0747  0.0228 -3.2786  -0.1271 0.0437  -2.9086
Constant 0.0007  0.0006 1.1209  0.0038 0.0013  2.9265
              
   J-stat  CriticalJ  p-value   J-stat  Critical  J  p-value 
Over-identification 18.1474  26.2962 0.40  16.8151 26.2962 0.49
Null = only 
constant  379.0942 9.4877 0.00   33.0418 9.4877  0.00
Note: Estimation period is 1977 to 1998. 
          Instruments: the first-differenced R/K, land price, investment, production, and capital prices. 
          4 lags are taken for each instrument (i.e., variables of 2 to 5 years before). 
 Table 5 Effects on MFP by industry
Coefficients
Capital Price Land Price Output Constant
11 Livestock products 0.369 -0.065 0.228 0.006
12 Processed marine products 0.116 0.000 0.131 0.003
13 Rice polishing, flour milling 0.308 -0.137 0.111 0.001
14 Other foods 0.860 -0.064 0.772 0.026
15 Beverages -0.068 -0.091 1.197 -0.024
16 Tobacco 0.237 -0.075 0.417 -0.009
17 Silk -2.179 1.107 4.108 -0.027
18 Spinning 0.119 -0.068 0.224 0.002
19 Fabrics and other textile products -0.021 0.074 0.372 0.017
20 Apparel and accessories 0.814 -0.058 0.328 0.018
21 Lumber and wood products -0.039 -0.106 0.298 0.010
22 Furniture 0.236 -0.098 0.235 0.000
23 Pulp, paper, paper products 0.312 -0.020 0.184 0.009
24 Publishing and printing -0.022 -0.001 0.194 0.000
25 Leather and leather products 0.280 -0.121 0.416 -0.007
26 Rubber products 0.266 -0.090 0.491 0.015
27 Basic chemicals 0.264 -0.036 0.404 0.003
28 Chemical fiber 0.128 -0.010 0.127 0.006
29 Other chemicals 0.087 0.009 0.484 0.010
30 Petroleum products 0.353 0.033 0.172 -0.001
31 Coal products -0.127 0.120 0.616 -0.006
32 Stone, clay & glass products 0.448 0.043 0.572 -0.011
33 Steel manufacturing 0.172 -0.073 0.292 0.005
34 Other steel 0.071 0.060 0.428 0.006
35 Non-ferrous metals 0.206 -0.074 0.510 0.003
36 Metal products 0.109 -0.040 0.197 -0.004
37 General machinery equipment 0.475 -0.122 0.385 0.001
38 Electrical machinery 0.329 -0.038 0.254 -0.001
39 Equipment and supplies for household use 0.297 -0.124 0.355 -0.004
40 Other electrical machinery -0.078 0.191 0.125 0.002
41 Motor vehicles -0.019 0.110 0.173 0.006
42 Ships 0.103 -0.007 0.059 -0.002
43 Other transportation equipment 0.212 0.064 0.298 -0.004
44 Precision machinery & equipment 0.161 -0.050 0.233 -0.004
45 Other manufacturing 0.139 -0.056 0.274 0.002
46 Construction -0.041 0.030 0.197 -0.002
47 Civil engineering 0.288 -0.022 0.322 -0.003
48 Electricity 0.163 0.031 0.351 -0.007
49 Gas, heat supply -0.028 0.039 0.611 -0.020
50 Waterworks 0.192 0.119 0.137 0.010
51 Water supply for industrial use 0.227 -0.003 0.329 -0.013
52 Waste disposal 0.196 0.046 0.664 -0.007
53 Wholesale 0.105 -0.010 0.697 -0.034
54 Retail 0.375 -0.292 0.733 -0.015
55 Finance 0.127 -0.090 0.697 -0.018
56 Insurance 0.175 0.013 0.540 -0.012
57 Real estate 0.140 -0.216 0.770 -0.007
58 Housing 0.317 -0.253 0.960 -0.055
59 Railway -0.642 0.099 -0.837 0.021
60 Road transportation 0.211 0.165 0.370 -0.008
61 Water transportation 0.359 -0.053 0.593 -0.015
62 Air transportation 0.177 -0.191 0.810 0.007
63 Other transportation, packing 0.090 0.005 0.248 -0.014
64 Telegraph, telephone 0.221 0.015 0.823 -0.031
65 Mail -0.102 0.055 0.684 -0.026
66 Education (private, non-profit) -0.016 0.067 0.891 -0.022
67 Research 0.298 -0.067 0.431 -0.005
68 Medical, hygiene (private) 0.525 -0.036 0.410 0.011
69 Other public services 0.233 -0.062 0.580 -0.031
70 Advertising 1.477 0.220 0.313 0.015
71 Rental of office equipment and goods 0.295 -0.043 0.625 -0.005
72 Other services for businesses 0.820 -0.488 0.194 -0.018
73 Entertainment -0.388 0.022 0.348 -0.028
74 Broadcasting 0.477 -0.199 0.563 -0.020
75 Restaurants 0.285 -0.214 0.731 -0.032
76 Inns 0.503 -0.009 0.313 0.001
77 Laundry, hair-cutting , public bath 0.666 -0.137 0.570 -0.004
78 Other services for individuals 0.666 -0.002 0.413 0.008
79 Education (public) 0.076 -0.010 0.604 -0.016
80 Medical, hygiene (public) 0.057 0.064 0.599 -0.017
81 Public administration 0.408 -0.142 0.640 -0.031
82 Medical, hygiene (non-profit) 0.163 -0.002 0.358 -0.012
83 Others(non-profit) 0.190 -0.013 0.387 -0.026Table 5 Effects on MFP by industry (continued
Standard Errors
Capital Price Land Price Output Constant
11 Livestock products 0.107 0.026 0.063 0.003
12 Processed marine products 0.097 0.028 0.098 0.004
13 Rice polishing, flour milling 0.056 0.041 0.113 0.005
14 Other foods 0.044 0.043 0.133 0.002
15 Beverages 0.021 0.016 0.084 0.002
16 Tobacco 0.177 0.031 0.102 0.004
17 Silk 0.119 0.110 0.103 0.003
18 Spinning 0.039 0.049 0.062 0.006
19 Fabrics and other textile products 0.025 0.013 0.024 0.002
20 Apparel and accessories 0.131 0.048 0.068 0.004
21 Lumber and wood products 0.064 0.038 0.056 0.003
22 Furniture 0.026 0.028 0.052 0.002
23 Pulp, paper, paper products 0.118 0.021 0.030 0.002
24 Publishing and printing 0.006 0.012 0.024 0.001
25 Leather and leather products 0.112 0.032 0.067 0.004
26 Rubber products 0.052 0.012 0.017 0.001
27 Basic chemicals 0.084 0.043 0.059 0.002
28 Chemical fiber 0.016 0.014 0.018 0.001
29 Other chemicals 0.031 0.022 0.030 0.002
30 Petroleum products 0.036 0.012 0.027 0.001
31 Coal products 0.065 0.054 0.181 0.010
32 Stone, clay & glass products 0.112 0.059 0.113 0.005
33 Steel manufacturing 0.101 0.020 0.030 0.002
34 Other steel 0.047 0.015 0.089 0.004
35 Non-ferrous metals 0.030 0.009 0.030 0.001
36 Metal products 0.049 0.022 0.071 0.003
37 General machinery equipment 0.124 0.015 0.044 0.002
38 Electrical machinery 0.071 0.010 0.013 0.001
39 Equipment and supplies for household use 0.067 0.017 0.022 0.001
40 Other electrical machinery 0.082 0.028 0.020 0.002
41 Motor vehicles 0.039 0.013 0.010 0.002
42 Ships 0.094 0.022 0.044 0.002
43 Other transportation equipment 0.097 0.077 0.047 0.007
44 Precision machinery & equipment 0.022 0.004 0.005 0.001
45 Other manufacturing 0.173 0.027 0.027 0.002
46 Construction 0.057 0.021 0.051 0.002
47 Civil engineering 0.060 0.024 0.039 0.002
48 Electricity 0.039 0.011 0.030 0.001
49 Gas, heat supply 0.083 0.017 0.101 0.003
50 Waterworks 0.034 0.046 0.073 0.006
51 Water supply for industrial use 0.090 0.045 0.077 0.004
52 Waste disposal 0.081 0.073 0.107 0.008
53 Wholesale 0.072 0.054 0.057 0.005
54 Retail 0.033 0.009 0.058 0.002
55 Finance 0.021 0.012 0.039 0.002
56 Insurance 0.057 0.033 0.043 0.002
57 Real estate 0.028 0.018 0.021 0.003
58 Housing 0.102 0.047 0.084 0.006
59 Railway 0.470 0.077 0.293 0.012
60 Road transportation 0.152 0.048 0.162 0.006
61 Water transportation 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.001
62 Air transportation 0.053 0.045 0.043 0.003
63 Other transportation, packing 0.145 0.048 0.032 0.002
64 Telegraph, telephone 0.044 0.022 0.048 0.003
65 Mail 0.026 0.021 0.059 0.006
66 Education (private, non-profit) 0.012 0.015 0.028 0.001
67 Research 0.009 0.012 0.030 0.002
68 Medical, hygiene (private) 0.041 0.031 0.034 0.004
69 Other public services 0.067 0.037 0.067 0.003
70 Advertising 0.234 0.099 0.086 0.010
71 Rental of office equipment and goods 0.063 0.025 0.019 0.002
72 Other services for businesses 0.046 0.064 0.088 0.012
73 Entertainment 0.240 0.088 0.203 0.020
74 Broadcasting 0.110 0.064 0.132 0.005
75 Restaurants 0.032 0.011 0.038 0.003
76 Inns 0.047 0.021 0.044 0.003
77 Laundry, hair-cutting , public bath 0.016 0.017 0.009 0.001
78 Other services for individuals 0.305 0.089 0.100 0.007
79 Education (public) 0.130 0.110 0.107 0.009
80 Medical, hygiene (public) 0.068 0.023 0.079 0.002
81 Public administration 0.094 0.033 0.075 0.008
82 Medical, hygiene (non-profit) 0.094 0.014 0.125 0.004
83 Others(non-profit) 0.045 0.026 0.054 0.003Table 5 Effects on MFP by industry (continued
t-values
Capital Price Land Price Output Constant
11 Livestock products 3.454 -2.544 3.606 1.867
12 Processed marine products 1.195 -0.005 1.344 0.595
13 Rice polishing, flour milling 5.531 -3.332 0.979 0.162
14 Other foods 19.601 -1.490 5.813 16.143
15 Beverages -3.185 -5.576 14.211 -10.861
16 Tobacco 1.340 -2.401 4.109 -1.982
17 Silk -18.348 10.098 40.073 -9.660
18 Spinning 3.018 -1.393 3.623 0.406
19 Fabrics and other textile products -0.849 5.838 15.248 7.287
20 Apparel and accessories 6.235 -1.215 4.807 4.927
21 Lumber and wood products -0.604 -2.804 5.313 3.875
22 Furniture 9.109 -3.459 4.554 0.091
23 Pulp, paper, paper products 2.638 -0.942 6.229 3.924
24 Publishing and printing -3.629 -0.102 8.242 -0.244
25 Leather and leather products 2.495 -3.841 6.190 -1.851
26 Rubber products 5.074 -7.745 29.796 11.823
27 Basic chemicals 3.157 -0.836 6.881 1.283
28 Chemical fiber 8.042 -0.708 6.948 7.359
29 Other chemicals 2.835 0.401 15.933 4.082
30 Petroleum products 9.890 2.690 6.321 -1.769
31 Coal products -1.951 2.208 3.398 -0.616
32 Stone, clay & glass products 3.986 0.739 5.061 -2.005
33 Steel manufacturing 1.705 -3.671 9.604 3.151
34 Other steel 1.492 4.085 4.812 1.522
35 Non-ferrous metals 6.973 -8.306 17.288 2.085
36 Metal products 2.221 -1.823 2.791 -1.306
37 General machinery equipment 3.845 -8.398 8.704 0.702
38 Electrical machinery 4.651 -3.657 20.166 -0.919
39 Equipment and supplies for household use 4.427 -7.234 15.812 -2.499
40 Other electrical machinery -0.949 6.925 6.406 0.717
41 Motor vehicles -0.495 8.539 16.997 2.934
42 Ships 1.103 -0.336 1.348 -0.797
43 Other transportation equipment 2.196 0.839 6.353 -0.600
44 Precision machinery & equipment 7.276 -11.377 43.067 -6.137
45 Other manufacturing 0.804 -2.087 10.166 0.936
46 Construction -0.729 1.431 3.876 -1.208
47 Civil engineering 4.848 -0.910 8.282 -1.537
48 Electricity 4.142 2.952 11.559 -6.859
49 Gas, heat supply -0.333 2.278 6.072 -5.949
50 Waterworks 5.580 2.558 1.868 1.713
51 Water supply for industrial use 2.520 -0.064 4.257 -3.039
52 Waste disposal 2.420 0.640 6.182 -0.904
53 Wholesale 1.451 -0.194 12.231 -7.545
54 Retail 11.320 -33.781 12.593 -7.083
55 Finance 5.960 -7.503 17.887 -10.949
56 Insurance 3.092 0.383 12.708 -5.187
57 Real estate 4.952 -11.792 36.322 -2.793
58 Housing 3.101 -5.436 11.484 -8.666
59 Railway -1.368 1.286 -2.856 1.749
60 Road transportation 1.387 3.447 2.280 -1.352
61 Water transportation 14.222 -3.225 24.558 -13.990
62 Air transportation 3.326 -4.207 18.971 2.399
63 Other transportation, packing 0.622 0.104 7.728 -5.975
64 Telegraph, telephone 5.066 0.688 17.080 -10.400
65 Mail -3.903 2.600 11.665 -4.546
66 Education (private, non-profit) -1.266 4.538 31.748 -23.339
67 Research 31.977 -5.563 14.191 -3.331
68 Medical, hygiene (private) 12.839 -1.162 11.971 2.884
69 Other public services 3.477 -1.680 8.618 -9.782
70 Advertising 6.311 2.236 3.620 1.499
71 Rental of office equipment and goods 4.677 -1.735 33.212 -2.642
72 Other services for businesses 17.700 -7.666 2.214 -1.513
73 Entertainment -1.614 0.243 1.716 -1.413
74 Broadcasting 4.325 -3.127 4.263 -4.232
75 Restaurants 9.005 -18.951 19.079 -12.945
76 Inns 10.678 -0.399 7.095 0.353
77 Laundry, hair-cutting , public bath 41.443 -8.311 64.740 -3.282
78 Other services for individuals 2.183 -0.025 4.127 1.217
79 Education (public) 0.583 -0.086 5.647 -1.942
80 Medical, hygiene (public) 0.836 2.805 7.629 -6.943
81 Public administration 4.349 -4.289 8.510 -3.912
82 Medical, hygiene (non-profit) 1.727 -0.114 2.856 -3.007













































Table 5 Effects on MFP by industry (continued
J-statistics Null=all coefficinets are zeros
J 5% critical p value Statistics 5% critical v p value
11 Livestock products 15.700 27.587 0.635 29.987 7.815 0.000
12 Processed marine products 18.781 27.587 0.425 28.876 7.815 0.000
13 Rice polishing, flour milling 12.679 27.587 0.818 47.065 7.815 0.000
14 Other foods 15.412 27.587 0.654 19804.27 7.815 0.000
15 Beverages 19.192 27.587 0.398 1628.68 7.815 0.000
16 Tobacco 18.175 27.587 0.465 190.06 7.815 0.000
17 Silk 17.581 27.587 0.506 5361.93 7.815 0.000
18 Spinning 13.155 27.587 0.792 61.172 7.815 0.000
19 Fabrics and other textile products 16.500 27.587 0.580 373.23 7.815 0.000
20 Apparel and accessories 21.564 27.587 0.259 73.785 7.815 0.000
21 Lumber and wood products 14.620 27.587 0.706 49.419 7.815 0.000
22 Furniture 15.885 27.587 0.622 106.81 7.815 0.000
23 Pulp, paper, paper products 19.068 27.587 0.406 68.040 7.815 0.000
24 Publishing and printing 15.439 27.587 0.652 243.07 7.815 0.000
25 Leather and leather products 18.738 27.587 0.427 106.13 7.815 0.000
26 Rubber products 17.611 27.587 0.504 1868.87 7.815 0.000
27 Basic chemicals 14.736 27.587 0.698 468.521 7.815 0.000
28 Chemical fiber 19.137 27.587 0.401 132.34 7.815 0.000
29 Other chemicals 13.268 27.587 0.786 395.84 7.815 0.000
30 Petroleum products 18.562 27.587 0.439 1737.04 7.815 0.000
31 Coal products 16.131 27.587 0.606 32.235 7.815 0.000
32 Stone, clay & glass products 19.160 27.587 0.400 128.96 7.815 0.000
33 Steel manufacturing 18.086 27.587 0.471 112.411 7.815 0.000
34 Other steel 16.241 27.587 0.598 53.335 7.815 0.000
35 Non-ferrous metals 13.547 27.587 0.770 342.33 7.815 0.000
36 Metal products 15.908 27.587 0.621 25.704 7.815 0.000
37 General machinery equipment 20.125 27.587 0.340 129.402 7.815 0.000
38 Electrical machinery 19.111 27.587 0.403 496.23 7.815 0.000
39 Equipment and supplies for household use 18.699 27.587 0.430 353.46 7.815 0.000
40 Other electrical machinery 19.889 27.587 0.354 673.06 7.815 0.000
41 Motor vehicles 15.319 27.587 0.660 707.332 7.815 0.000
42 Ships 17.789 27.587 0.491 21.642 7.815 0.000
43 Other transportation equipment 18.385 27.587 0.451 197.61 7.815 0.000
44 Precision machinery & equipment 17.186 27.587 0.533 2353.21 7.815 0.000
45 Other manufacturing 17.197 27.587 0.532 1509.15 7.815 0.000
46 Construction 17.844 27.587 0.488 68.017 7.815 0.000
47 Civil engineering 14.648 27.587 0.704 261.69 7.815 0.000
48 Electricity 16.691 27.587 0.567 259.08 7.815 0.000
49 Gas, heat supply 19.865 27.587 0.355 123.38 7.815 0.000
50 Waterworks 17.743 27.587 0.495 133.31 7.815 0.000
51 Water supply for industrial use 19.085 27.587 0.405 82.271 7.815 0.000
52 Waste disposal 17.091 27.587 0.539 173.65 7.815 0.000
53 Wholesale 16.802 27.587 0.559 705.14 7.815 0.000
54 Retail 13.383 27.587 0.780 2402.97 7.815 0.000
55 Finance 13.958 27.587 0.746 355.85 7.815 0.000
56 Insurance 17.182 27.587 0.533 345.09 7.815 0.000
57 Real estate 16.497 27.587 0.580 1410.78 7.815 0.000
58 Housing 20.925 27.587 0.293 275.741 7.815 0.000
59 Railway 13.301 27.587 0.784 22.810 7.815 0.000
60 Road transportation 20.090 27.587 0.342 107.72 7.815 0.000
61 Water transportation 13.310 27.587 0.784 1209.00 7.815 0.000
62 Air transportation 16.529 27.587 0.578 746.25 7.815 0.000
63 Other transportation, packing 13.918 27.587 0.749 125.55 7.815 0.000
64 Telegraph, telephone 16.037 27.587 0.612 615.49 7.815 0.000
65 Mail 18.697 27.587 0.430 169.25 7.815 0.000
66 Education (private, non-profit) 19.651 27.587 0.369 2339.541 7.815 0.000
67 Research 14.973 27.587 0.683 1049.72 7.815 0.000
68 Medical, hygiene (private) 14.843 27.587 0.691 1895.50 7.815 0.000
69 Other public services 20.758 27.587 0.303 153.40 7.815 0.000
70 Advertising 18.519 27.587 0.442 206.381 7.815 0.000
71 Rental of office equipment and goods 18.238 27.587 0.461 6295.24 7.815 0.000
72 Other services for businesses 17.617 27.587 0.503 1492.94 7.815 0.000
73 Entertainment 17.871 27.587 0.486 21.006 7.815 0.000
74 Broadcasting 19.572 27.587 0.374 48.533 7.815 0.000
75 Restaurants 14.361 27.587 0.722 651.871 7.815 0.000
76 Inns 18.326 27.587 0.455 267.44 7.815 0.000
77 Laundry, hair-cutting , public bath 17.841 27.587 0.488 23642.51 7.815 0.000
78 Other services for individuals 15.818 27.587 0.627 44.757 7.815 0.000
79 Education (public) 16.047 27.587 0.611 139.002 7.815 0.000
80 Medical, hygiene (public) 18.550 27.587 0.440 183.54 7.815 0.000
81 Public administration 18.247 27.587 0.460 491.74 7.815 0.000
82 Medical, hygiene (non-profit) 15.903 27.587 0.621 35.379 7.815 0.000
83 Others(non-profit) 20.401 27.587 0.323 117.511 7.815 0.000